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Abstract
A NASA Research Grant NAG-1-1309 - Distributed Fiber Optic Systems
for Commercial Aircraft was awarded to David Game during July 1991 effec-
tively providing partial release time from his duties as a professor of Com- .
puter Science at Christopher Newport University for the purposes stated in
the grant proposal. As a result of miscominunication between the investigator
and NASA contact, the investigator did not submit a report at the end of the
time-frame funded by the grant. This report primarily constitutes a summary
of findings of the original background research done at that time.
1 Background
NASA is embarking on a research project to design the next generation of commer-
cial aircraft, Fly by Light / Power by Wire. The objectives of this effort are to
improve commercial aircraft design by
• reducing the weight of the aircraft to improve efficiency and
• improving the fault-tolerance and safety of the aircraft by
enhancing current systems with new technologies, or
introducing new systems into the aircraft.
1.1 Fly by Light
The Fly by Light component of this research effort addresses the use of optical sen-
sors and fiber optics in conjunction with electronic computers to perform control
and other support functions in the aircraft. Today's electrical components are sus-
ceptible to interference and other types of electromagnetic forces, whereas the fiber
optical components are not. Therefore, replacement of the electrical components
with optical components provides an opportunity to reduce significantly the proba-
bility of failure due to these types of errors. In addition to the improved immunity
to factors in the operating environment, optical systems have bandwidth improve-
ments on the order of ten to one hundred times that of current digital electrical
systems and this factor may grow significantly higher depending on the results of
current research in coherent transmission and reception. The utilization of such
large bandwidths in aircraft systems has not been investigated and it is anticipated
that it will allow for both new systems and for fault tolerance in the communica-
tion systems. The design of the optical sensors will be headed by NASA Lewis, the
sister site for the research on the project, and the design of the architecture of the
computer system (including the communications system) is under the leadership of
NASA Langley.
1.2 Power by Wire
Power by Wire considers the replacement of the current hydraulics systems of the
aircraft with systems which are electrical, resulting in a significant weight reduction
in the aircraft. This grant does not encompass the consideration of Power by Wire.
1.3 Evolution of Integration
Although digital systems have been integrated into, or replaced many electronic
devices in existence today and have also replaced many mechanical devices, areas
such as avionics have been slower than many technological areas to embrace digital
devices due to the strict requirements for flight critical systems. The initial use of
digital systems was to function as a backup to mechanical systems or as a primary
system with electro-mechanical backup systems available in the event of a system
failure.
Fly by wire flight control systems have been utilized to enhance stability and
control systems but were not themselves flight critical. Similar claims could be
made about systems supporting navigation and communication. In the last decade
there has been a significant move towards the integration of digital avionics into
flight/life-critical systems of the aircraft. The fact that digital systems typically
require less power, less space, and weigh less than a corresponding mechanical or
electro-mechanical system having numerous consequences including the following:
• the crowded flight panel could be reengineered to include more manageable
digital displays and more efficient use of the cockpit space,
• the total weight of the aircraft could be reduced resulting in both fuel savings
and maneuverability or that the payload of the aircraft could increased,
• less stable aircraft requiring greater manueverability could be flown by control
mechanisms with better reaction time than is manually possible, and
• more intelligent interpretation of the information could be performed by digital
systems.
As mentioned in the Statement of Work in the original proposal, this grant
will concentrate in the communications system design. Communications system
alternatives will be identified and a suggested list of specific research initiatives are
included. NASA Lewis work is not incorporated in this report.
2 Reliability
The Achilles heel of most digital systems has long been the inability to prove cor-
rectness of either hardware or software performance. Hardware devices suffer from
the unknowns of environmental factors including temperature, humidity, electro-
magnetic fields, lightning, etc. One can simulate performance of such devices and
systems, but it is impossible to predict exactly those influences which might affect
its performance given the extremely large numbers of combinations of those effects.
Isolation and testing of one factor is difficult, but testing combinational effects can
only be performed within limits.
Development of reliable software has long been the target of extensive effort.
Perhaps the best description of the obtainable objective for the software industry at
large is damage control as opposed to elimination of errors. Nonetheless, a specific
problem domain adhering to specific practices could potentially lower the probability
of error significantly.
2.1 Hardware
The problems of verification of hardware are numerous as are the levels at which
reliability must be examined. At the gate/device level, there are questions concern-
ing the effects of environmental factors mentioned previously as well as the effects
of timing constraints. The infinite combinations of these factors and their combina-
tional effects represent an intimidating problem.
At the instruction level there is the question of correctness, whether or not the
instruction set functions as specified without any unanticipated side effects. Proving
correctness of the instruction set is even more difficult than proving correctness of
a specific program. In this case it is necessary to show that every combination
of instructions which can be written will function properly. On the other hand,
hardware systems are typically slowly evolved systems with the same fundamental
architecture of previous generation devices.
[3] contains a synopsis of a presentation made by Brock and Hunt on behalf
of Computational Logic, Inc. which summarizes a body of work constituting a
formal methodology for design of correct circuits. The methodology entails writing
and verifying circuit generator programs and then using the generators to produce
circuits which can be proven to be correct. This process was used to produce an
ALU generator and it was anticipated that it would be used to create a FM8502
microprocessor. Work in areas such as this should provide the basis for creating
more verifiable hardware systems.
At the device/board level there are questions of interface and interaction. In
order to assure the correct interaction of devices, there exists a body of research in
the area of communications which could be applied. If devices are specified in terms
of state machines, the device interactions could be analyzed using the same type of
tools to verify protocol correctness, deadlock avoidance, etc.
In addition, the hardware industry is such a. rapidly evolving field that one must
strive to develop rigid standards for any new devices so as to assure their safe
integration into the existing systems. Extremely rigid testing procedures exist for
any flight/life-critical systems on the aircraft, but testing alone can not be expected
to achieve the reliability levels expected in these systems. Reliability is such a critical
issue with flight systems that the industry appears to be doomed to using technology
which is a decade old in order to use devices with proven effectiveness. It is an
interesting paradox that the industry is on the cutting edge of many technological
fields but appears to be constrained to use it until the technology becomes effectively
outdated.
2.2 Software
Similar and perhaps more difficult problems exist in the area of software. Although
formal verification techniques for software exists, the application of these techniques
to large systems is far from mature. Some might argue that the potential for these
verification methods to large systems does not look promising. It is more likely
that effective software systems will evolve in the same ways that effective hardware
systems do, by starting with smaller working systems and adding to them incremen-
tally, relying on the core elements from earlier stages as building blocks. By relying
on these core elements as building blocks, one also gains the advantage of additional
testing and insight, and increased reliability in those building blocks.
Most of the computing industry has embraced object-oriented methodologies
because of the ability of the methodology to build in such an incremental framework.
Similarly, many applications are moving towards the client/server model of design.
This has a number of significant advantages.
1. A functional interface can be developed to provide generic services. As more
efficient means of implementing the service evolve, the component(server) can
be replaced without affecting the rest of the system.
2. Association of logical functions with physical devices can be made transpar-
ent through the use of networks. Networks have been in sufficient use for
more that a decade with a strong body of research and practice defining the
strengths and weaknesses of alternatives to support such activities. The use
of object-oriented design will allow for easier integration of new functionality
while maintaining prior functionality. It is incumbent on the aircraft industry
to begin designing the functional software services it needs and the interface
specifications for these systems to allow for competitive development of prod-
ucts within the industry.
3. Many of the services required are also likely the same type of services re-
quired in other software environments (databases, synchronization, virtual
device management, etc.) carrying with them the vast testing already associ-
ated with its use in industry.
Although there have been continued developments in the area of design and
development of reliable software systems, it remains difficult to show reliability at a
quantifiable level such as those required for life-critical systems (probability of 10~9
or less of failure per flight hour ). The added complexity of building systems with
greater functional expectation brings with it the problem of increased difficulty of
building an equally reliable system.
Viewing the state of design of avionics systems from the perspective of a com-
puter scientist, I find most of the approaches to solving the problem to be the
results of systems evolved incrementally from prior working engineering solutions as
opposed to those which view the problem from an abstract design perspective em-
ploying accepted and proven design methodologies. As avionics embarks on the use
of computer-based systems to control more systems within the aircraft, the prob-
lems are either now, or will soon grow, beyond the ability of the engineers to control
their correctness and reliability without the employment of more formal tools and
methods.
[3] contains some revealing comments which imply a severe lack of understanding
of the depth of complexity of software development along with an acknowledgment
that these problems can only be addressed with the employment of some formal
methods. Examples:
• "The FMS of the A320 'was still revealing software bugs until mid-January',
according to Gerard Guyot (Airbus test and development director). There
was no particular type of bug in any particular function, he says. 'We just
had to do a lot of flying in order to check it all out. Then suddenly it was
working,' he says with a grin" (Flight International, 27 Feb 1989)".
The director of testing implies that software bugs were arising for an extended
period of time, but 'not in any particular function'. They just disappeared
magically after testing a long enough period of time. There are some serious
ambiguities here accompanied by a belief that the bugs were eliminated by
flying long enough to test all possible things that could go wrong. The uncov-
ering of such problems at actual flight test time indicates to me that there are
some significant design oversights, not simply an uncovered bug. With good
testing strategies and rigid software interface/performance specifications, the
type of bugs uncovered during flight testing should have been problems due
to timing interaction and problems from of unanticipated sources. The latter
indicates a need for a reevaluation of the design. The former implies a need
for a more rigorous investigation of the timing requirements of the system,
similar to the problem with the next example.
• Dale Mackall, NASA Engineer if the AFTI F16 Flight test states that nearly
all failure indications were not due to actual hardware failures, but to design
oversights concerning asynchronous computer operation. This represents an
important insight. As hardware becomes more and more reliable, our more
significant concerns are not that of component failure rather it is due to in-
consistency of interface expectation within system components and timing
problems on the system level.
Work in the area of estimating software reliability also has limited applicability.
The results of such related research [5] appears to have validity to closed system
components, but it is difficult to characterize the entire system as having errors
occur with characteristics such as exponential interarrival times. Systems which
are less deterministic are more difficult to characterize with the types of confidence
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intervals (probability of success rates) required in avionics. For example, [5] uses
reliability rates of 90%, far below that of the requirements of this arena..
System specifications and interactions do appear to be in need of the inclusion
of some formal methods and likely the development of new research to- reach overall
system reliability expected is required. The use of some of the formal tools for
evaluation of communications protocols could provide a basis for the development of
similar tools for specification of device and component interaction. Reliability tools
such as described in [4] provide another approach for developing an understanding
of this problem. However, the technique as presented in [4] does not have the ability
to represent time dependencies, nor does it suggest a mechanism for exchange of
pertinent state variables describing the state of all relevant system components.
Adoption of SEI level requirements of its own software development teams and
contractors might be a reasonable first step in solving this problem. Lastly, the
specification and verification tools should evolve to some common methodology for
both hardware and software systems so that the systems can be analyzed as a unit
rather than separate components.
3 Data Communications
The communications system for an aircraft must meet the same requirements for
reliability as for other flight/life-critical systems, and in addition it would be desir-
able to maintain interoperability. Contrary to other digital system components the
communications systems already have a significant amount of research and practice
with design methodologies which support interoperability. The OSI model for design
of communication systems or a similar architecture would provide a framework with
which to design a system which can evolve incrementally as more reliable hardware
evolves or as protocol stacks are designed which are either more efficient or provide
support for other forms of traffic.
3.1 Error Detection and Correction
Error detection and correction has always been an important area of digital com-
munication systems. Bit error rates of current fiber optic standards are on the order
of 2.5 x 10~10[8]. For
n, Bits in a frame,
biti Probability of a bit in error, and
mej Probability of a frame in error,
Pfframe = (l ~ ^/M*)"
Probability of an error in a frame is:
Frame Size (Bytes) Frame Error
10 2 x 10~(-8)
1000 2 x 10"(-6)
One can see that the probability of a frame error is high relative to ultrareliable
levels previously sta.ted, but what is important is not whether an error occurs, rather
will the error be detected. Error detection mechanisms such as CRC are adept at
detecting most errors and burst errors of a sufficiently small nature, however, there
do exists certain errors which CRC will not detect. Error correction is handled
by protocols which manage retransmissions, buffering etc. The limitation of the
effectiveness of current communication strategies is determined by the accuracy
of detection of errors by CRC. With sufficient bandwidth, transmission multiple
times or on multiple links can produce sufficiently low error rates. Sending on
separate links assures independence of probability of error,, with the probability of
two messages in error being the product of the individual frame probabilities of
error. If a frame with transmission error rate of 10~5 is transmitted on two identical
links, the probability of both frames having an error would be 10~5 x 10~5 = 10~10.
By employing redundancy with proper frame size, a communications physical link
with unacceptable error detection rates could be made sufficiently reliable, raising
the probability of detection.
3.2 Reliability
The kinds of reliability problems one intends to solve here are very different than the
typical kinds of reliability issues addressed in most data communications systems.
Line breaks and chattering nodes are the most frequent sources of errors and are
discussed later.
Aircraft reliability can and should incorporate past history of physical damage
to the aircraft of assign probability of damage to a physical area and design the links
and processing centers so that the probability of incapacitating the system with an
explosion is minimized.
4 Utilization of Higher Bandwidth
Higher bandwidths provide an opportunity to pass more state information and as-
sure that system reliability constraints are met. Increases in processor performance
and communication bandwidth provide opportunities to check system variables for
consistency/reliability.
Current bandwidth requirements of aircraft systems are on the order of 10 Mbps.
MIL-STD-1553 defines the standards for a digital bus on a modern military aircraft
and Mark 33, 429 on a civil aircraft. Fiber optic networks operate in the lOOMbps-
iGbps range and are more than sufficient to meet these minimum requirements.
The question here appears to be the degree to which the network and the speed
of corresponding memory and processors exceed the minimum requirements. With
sufficiently fast devices, a design can be created to allow time for redundancy checks
and recalculation, reconfiguration or rollback depending on the situation. The major
factors to be determined are what constitutes the calculation requirements of the
entire system. One should be optimistic that this will be attainable as processors
and communication devices become faster as the basic requirements to fly an aircraft
remain stable. Once the basic requirements can be met in a fault tolerant manner,
additional bandwidth can be used to incrementally add optional functionality to
assist the pilot.
4.1 Flight Control
The potential applications of optical fiber are constantly evolving. Stress and strain
gauges functions are being investigated by examining the manner in which the light
characteristics change as the fiber is stretched or distorted. By embedding these
fibers into the structures of the aircraft, the pilot can be alerted as the aircraft ex-
periences critical stress. As more sophisticated weather systems evolve, the networks
can provide ample bandwidth for high-resolution imaging of the systems.
As more and more of the components in the aircraft become digital, networks will
comprise an essential function to support integration of these devices. Intelligent
computing systems to support the pilot require input from as many of these devices
as possible, and place a requirement of high reliability on the network operation.
Current transmission rates of fiber optic systems is sufficiently high to meet the
basic data rate requirements of existing devices. As mentioned previously, one use
of the bandwidth could be to use the incorporate redundant transmission for higher
reliability.
4.2 Passenger Utility and Service
One of the most exciting aspects of fiber communication is the opportunity that
such a leap in potential bandwidth provides to realize systems to make commercial
flight more enjoyable and productive for the passengers. Fundamentally there are
two types data supported by a digital network, synchronous and asynchronous.
Synchronous traffic would typically include video, voice and real-time devices with
time constraints on the interaction. Flat panel displays and densely interchangeable
storage devices such as cd-rom combine to provide entertainment and education
opportunities so that passengers make more efficient use of "the flight time. Each
seat could have its own display and choose from numerous entertainment/education
options. Information could be available to allow the passenger to view other flight
schedules for connections, project arrival times, learn about the geography over
which the plane is currently traversing or will cross at some time during the flight, or
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even provide travelogues for cities and towns in the vicinity of the flight destination.
Advertisement from local merchants could be used to generate income. With the
large bandwidths available, device traffic which is not flight-critical could accompany
this traffic.
Voice traffic could also be digitized and used to provide communication with
other passengers on the plane or conceivably to provide external communication to
passengers on the ground or in other aircraft. The proliferation of ISDN phones in
the near future will make digital voice at commonplace.
As the United States and the rest of the world becomes more committed to
an infrastructure to support a completely connected world, computing services to
include standard software packages or perhaps standard network functions such as
email, internet, and information services will be in higher demand. Fiber optics are
capable of providing sufficient for the anticipated network traffic.
4.3 Alternative Coding Techniques
Assuming the required data rates are in the tens of Mbps range, an interesting alter-
native use of the bandwidth is increase the network tolerance of error in its optical
receivers and transmitters. An example of the use of this bandwidth employing a
combination of frequency-division and code-division multiplexing in optical networks
is contained in [11].
5 Fault Tolerance
5.1 Requirements
The need for fault tolerance in aircraft, spacecraft and many other areas in which
NASA has interests is evident. [9] indicates that the reliability requirements for
SIFT and FTMP computers expected to be used in ultrareliable systems limit fail-
ure probability not to exceed 10~9 for a 10 hour flight. Such a stringent requirement
impacts every component of design. One could always slowly integrate more so-
phisticated systems, gradually increasing the reliability and critical applicability of
the systems, but achieving the kinds of reliability cited above can not be achieved
by exhaustive testing. More formal evaluation is demanded. This statement is not
contradicting a prior statement concerning the need to build reliable systems out of
simpler working systems. In this context the concept indicates that as we learn to
formally evaluate the simpler systems, better tools and methods should evolve for
evaluating more complex systems.










However, the primary purpose of this report focuses on the communications
support, so emphasis will be placed only on those aspects which directly impact the
communications architecture.
5.2 Byzantine Resilience
There exist a number of potential architectures which provide varying degrees of
fault-tolerance depending on system requirements [7]. Previous research into viable
fault-tolerant architectures for aircraft and spacecraft indicates that architectures
which are "Byzantine resilient" are being given the greatest attention.
The architecture proposed by CDSL [6] is a medium to coarse grain architecture
which appears to allow voting on functional results such as either control decisions or
coarse grained intermediate steps in the control decision process. Although this may
not be the final architecture chosen for the aircraft versus the long space mission
application of the referenced literature, it is assumed so for the purposes of this
report. Limitations of some alternatives will also be discussed.
The Byzantine resilient architectures require highly interconnected components.
Each fault-containment region must be connected on a separate communications
path with corresponding fault-containment regions. Distinct fault-containment re-
gions could be organized on the basis of numerous factors to include performance,
physical position, and/or function. For example, at a very high level, concentration
of the decision making devices or intercommunication paths into one physical area
of the aircraft could render the craft inoperable if a structural failure such as a
break in the wing, tail section or damage to the control panel occurs. Placement of
redundant elements should incorporate both functional and other considerations.
5.3 Fault Tolerance in Communications Systems
Highly interconnected devices have been the subject of considerable research, but the
results of these investigations have limited applicability to this problem area. Such




Figure 1: A 4-node Byzantine Resilient Structure
Figure 2: FDDI Healing
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Figure 3: Braided Ring
have an associated set of experiences and the insights which this experience creates.
Fault-tolerance in communications networks of today focus more on issues such as
how to deal with cable breaks and chattering nodes, and down bridges /routers rather
than how to support complex detection and reconfiguration algorithms as is used
in a Byzantine resilient design. For example, consider how a dual counter-rotating
token ring (FDDI) handles healing in Figure 2. In the first case observe a fully
functional ring. If a node were to begin chattering or a break in the cable occurred,
the network could be reconfigured into a single ring as indicated. This approach
would work fine for a single failure, but a second failure would not allow for exclusion
of the individual node, but would segment the network, disabling communication
between vital elements.
The interconnectivity is usually accomplished by employing existing architec-
tures (token rings, CSMA/CD and token bus)in conjunction with bridges, routers
and gateways and higher level protocol stacks to manage routing functions. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates a highly interconnected design. The network is created by braiding
multiple rings.
This approach is not applicable to a typical FTPP cluster. Figure 1 shows one
implemented with ring architectures. Two rings a-b-c-d-a and a-c-b-d-'a could cover
the inter node connections, but would violate fundamental Byzantine rules for the
same reason. The application to specific problem areas such as this are in need
of investigation, but the fundamental Byzantine strategy should be upheld. The
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expense for implementation will be high, but the approach has a proven reliability.
Designs such as this fail to satisfy the Byzantine requirements and could nega-
tively compromise the reliability of the design. Each connection must function in-
dependently in the expectation that a failed connection would not affect any other
connection. A token ring is typically implemented as a series of point to point trans-
missions with a one or more bit delays at each node. Despite this characteristic a
failed link can impair the transmission between any pair of nodes of the ring con-
taining the failed link. If these types of designs are being considered, it is important
that this problem be investigated further.
6 Protocols
It is not clear that the advantages of inefficient protocol stacks such as the ISO model
advocates can be afforded. The specific nature and the load requirements associated
with the design will influence the overhead affordable. Nonetheless, it appears that
one of the significant contributions which has yet to be made in support of this are
is the design of protocol alternatives which support concepts such as
1. replication and voting,
2. recalculation,
3. confirmation, and
4. advancement to next calculation.
Current protocol error detection entails using CRC-based error detection and
request for retransmission. Support for fault tolerance requires detection on the basis
of comparison of results from duplicated processes. In addition there are naming
problems associated with the proper identification of the task being executed and
which redundant process is sending the result. Proposals for these protocols and the
associated overhead and verification will be an important component of the design
process.
7 Survey of Architectures
The study of communications topologies with respect to fault tolerance has received
a great deal of recent attention [1,2,10]. [l] contains a summary of the fault toler-
ant characteristics of a series of topologies. [7] makes some compelling observations
concerning the applicability of architectures such as hyper-cubes to Byzantine re-
silient design and concludes that they can not be rapidly reconfigured. In order
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to be consistent with the ultra-reliable levels of fault tolerance, point to point in-
terconnectivity appears to be a must. Using a regular design such as FTPP and
electro-optical interfaces should lead to a design which is modular, amenable to
VLSI design, and easily reconfigured as faults occur.
If the architecture supports sufficient reconfiguration capabilities so as to meet
the reliability requirements, it should be possible to consider the network as an ab-
stract entity and design a protocol to support a transparent healing when necessary.
A device would simply transmit a solution and receive a response that its ok to
proceed or recalculate, assuming the system is still functional. Last, it is crucial
that consideration is only given to networks which are deterministic in nature to
the degree that a minimum performance can be guaranteed. Token rings can be
guaranteed a minimal access whereas CSMA/CD buses can not.
8 Conclusions
The network architecture which will evolve will probably be a series of networks,
not necessarily, but likely, interconnected. The most serious mistake which can be
made is to try to accomodate current networks such as token rings into a fault
tolerant architecture. A fault tolerant design should have a network architecture
which is consistent with the philosophy of the overall design. An architecture of
highly interconnected, point-to-point links appears to be the logical direction for
the degree of fault tolerance expected in this area.
My suggestions for related research are as follows.
1. If Byzantine resiliency is determined to be a necessary condition for the Fly
by Light / Power by Wire generation of aircraft, then significant considera-
tion need to be given to a physical layer communications interface which will
support point to point connections. Point to point connection is a minimal
requirement or the requirement in order to provide independent paths. Other
alternatives exist but they violate the design of the rest of a Byzantine system
such as FTPP.
2. In addition a protocol should be developed to provide support for
(a) replication and voting,
(b) recalculation,
(c) confirmation, and
(d) advancement to next calculation.
3. A study of software interface specifications and the potential adaptation of
protocol verification to this problem could bring some formal tools to the
process.
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4. If the communications infrastructure for a Byzantine resilient architecture is
to be build from rings, the effect of a failed link should be investigated.
5. A study should be made to analyze the probability of physical damage and
otherwise to certain areas of the aircraft and to locate redundant computing
centers and network links throughout the aircraft in order to minimize the
likelihood of total system failures. This study should incorporate to whatever
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